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ABSTRACT
Explainability algorithms such as LIME have enabledmachine learn-
ing systems to adopt transparency and fairness, which are impor-
tant qualities in commercial use cases. However, recent work has
shown that LIME’s naive sampling strategy can be exploited by
an adversary to conceal biased, harmful behavior. We propose to
make LIME more robust by training a generative adversarial net-
work to sample more realistic synthetic data which the explainer
uses to generate explanations. Our experiments demonstrate that
our proposed method demonstrates an increase in accuracy across
three real-world datasets in detecting biased, adversarial behavior
compared to vanilla LIME. This is achieved while maintaining com-
parable explanation quality, with up to 99.94% in top-1 accuracy in
some cases.1
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Supervised learning by clas-
sification; •Human-centered computing→ Systems and tools
for interaction design.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Explainability is a topic of growing interest especially in appli-
cations where trust and transparency are requirements. Several
1Code for our experiments can be found at https://github.com/seansaito/Faster-LIME
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methods exist for explaining the decisions of an otherwise black-
box machine learning model, including the Locally Interpretable
Model-Agnostic Explanation (LIME) algorithm [9] and SHAP [5].
Recent work in adversarial machine learning has shown that
even these explainability algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. The objectives of the attacks vary, including extracting a
high-fidelity copy of the black-box model ([3]), identifying training
data membership of individual data points ([10], [6]), or concealing
harmful, biased behavior of black-box models on categories like
race, sex, and religion ([11]).
In this work, we propose a method which addresses the last type
of attack. In particular, we propose using the Conditional Tabular
GAN (CTGAN) model [12] to generate more realistic synthetic data
for querying the model to be explained. Our experiments involving
both black-box and white-box adversarial attacks demonstrate that
our model can more accurately detect biased behavior as compared
to the vanilla LIME model. To the best of our knowledge, this is one
of the first attempts at making LIMEmore robust against adversarial
attacks.
2 OVERVIEW OF LIME
Given some target model f to be explained, LIME produces an
explanation e for it by optimizing for both local model fidelity and
complexity. For some prediction f (x), LIME produces some expla-
nation e(x) which optimizes the following:
argmin
e
L(f , e,πx ) + Ω(e) (1)
Local model fidelity L here refers to how faithful the explana-
tion is to the model being explained, f, in a locality measured by πx
around a specific prediction f (x). In practice, e is typically a gener-
alized linear model and L is usually defined as a locally-weighted
squared loss:
L =
∑
z,z′∈Z
πx (z)(f (z) − e(z′))2 (2)
where z, z′ ∈ Z refer to synthetic data sampled around x and its
binary representation, and πx (z) = exp(−D(x,z)
2
σ 2 ). D represents
some appropriate distance measure according to the data domain
(cosine distance for text data and L2 distance for images). LIME
only relies on query-access to the black-box model for constructing
pairs of (z, f (z)), thereby establishing model agnosticism.
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Figure 1: 2-D PCA projection of real data and synthetic data
generated by LIME
2.1 Attack on LIME
A notable drawback with LIME’s sampling method – and the core
problem we seek to address in this work – is that the synthetic
samples are typically generated by sampling from a unit Gaussian,
X ∼ N(0, 1) around the instance to be explained. Recently, Slack et
al. [11] have identified that this leads to the creation of explanations
based on identifiably out-of-distribution (OOD) synthetic data, as
shown in Figure 1. They subsequently proposed an adversarial
attack – which we subsequently refer to as the Fooling-LIME attack
– that exploits this vulnerability and hides biased behavior from
explainers like LIME.
In particular, suppose that an adversary has a biased classifier a
which he/she wants to hide from the auditor who uses explainability
algorithms to detect biased, harmful behavior. The adversary first
constructs a critic c which predicts how realistic a given data point
is. This can be done by creating a dataset comprised of real data
and synthetic samples generated by LIME, and then training c on
this binary classification task. A scaffolding function s is then used
to route data points based on predictions of c:
s(x) =
{
a(x), if c(x) ≥ 0.5
ψ (x), otherwise (3)
In other words, if c determines x to be anOOD sample, i.e. coming
from an explainer query, s routes x to ψ , a model which exhibits
unbiased behavior. The explainer, given prediction behavior coming
from ψ rather than a, would be fooled into determining that the
adversary is unbiased and innocuous.
3 IMPROVING THE ROBUSTNESS OF LIME
In this section, we introduce our proposed methods for improving
the robustness of LIME.
3.1 Smarter locality sampling
We propose to employ a sampling model which learns to generate
realistic data. More specifically, we would like a data sampler д that
optimizes the following objective:
maximize c(д(x))
s.t. |x − д(x)| ≤ δ (4)
In other words, the goal of д is to "fool" the adversarial critic
c into thinking that the samples generated by д are indeed real.
x = {c1, . . . cn ,d1, . . . ,dm } is a row from some tabular data, which
represents a concatenation of continuous variables C1, . . . ,Cn and
discrete variables D1, . . . ,Dm . This optimization problem is similar
to that of generative adversarial networks, and we thus use the
Conditional Tabular GAN (CTGAN) model [12] as д. CTGAN over-
comes the limitations of the vanilla GAN by facilitating sampling
from non-Gaussian and multi-modal distributions, creating more
realistic tabular data. It generates data by taking in two inputs - a
noise vector z sampled from a standard normal distribution and a
conditional vectorm that selects categories from the discrete vari-
ables which influences the output of the generator. As mentioned
in [12], we use WGAN loss to train CTGAN:
L = E [d(д(z,m))] − E [d(x)] − λE
[ (∥∇xˆd(xˆ)∥2 − 1)2] (5)
where the last term is the gradient penalty from [2] which en-
forces Lipschitz smoothness of the model weights. During inference,
instead of generating synthetic data from a randomly sampled con-
ditional vector, we condition CTGAN with the categorical values
of x , the given data instance to be explained:
X˜ = д(z,mx ) (6)
wheremx is a concatenation of binarymask vectorsmd1 , . . .mdm ,
each indicating the categorical values of x in one-hot form:
mkdi
=
{
1, if k = xdi
0, otherwise
for k = 1, . . . , |Di |
mx =md1 ⊕md2 · · · ⊕mdn
(7)
Using the actual categorical values of x conditions д to gener-
ate synthetic data that is more local with respect to x . We further
enhance the synthetic neighborhood by utilizing the discrimina-
tor d(x) obtained through the CTGAN training process to prune
unrealistic samples:
X˜f il ter ed = {x |x ∈ X˜ ,d(x) ≥ τ } (8)
where τ is a threshold for filtering out unrealistic samples. The
final synthetic samples Xf il ter ed are then used to optimize a gen-
eralized linear model, with the coefficients representing the attribu-
tions of each feature to the given model prediction. Table 1 displays
sample COMPAS data generated by CTGAN. We subsequently refer
to our proposed method as CTGAN-LIME.
4 THREAT MODEL
We now provide context to our work by elaborating the threat
model under which we conduct our experiments.
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Table 1: Sample COMPAS data generated by CTGAN
age two_year_recid priors_count length_of_stay race
35 0 12 541 1
20 1 2 248 0
25 1 2 31 1
25 0 4 365 0
43 0 9 62 1
4.1 Adversarial objectives
We suppose an adversary whose goal is to deploy an adversarial
model a into some productive landscape. a is adversarial in that it
produces biased, unfair predictions based on sensitive features of
the data. For example, in the COMPAS dataset, where the task is to
predict the likelihood of recidivism for a given convict, a could be
implemented as:
a(x) =
{
1, if xrace = "African American"
0, otherwise
(9)
In the process of deploying the model, the adversary may be
subject to an auditory process. We assume that the implementation
of a is hidden from the auditor to preserve intellectual property.
Hence the auditor may use some explainer e to query the model
and discover any biased, harmful behavior. The objective of the
adversary is then to fool e into thinking that a is innocuous.
4.2 Adversarial settings
We experiment with two adversarial settings, namely black-box and
white-box. In the former, the adversary does not have access to the
explainer e nor its implementation; it only receives queries from
e . In our experiments, we attack CTGAN-LIME using the original
Fooling-LIME attack, which trains its critic c based on synthetic
samples generated by the LIME strategy, to measure robustness of
CTGAN-LIME against the prevailing adversarial attack.
However, to further fortify our investigation, we also conduct
experiments under the white-box setting, where we assume that
the adversary now has increased access to e , including its specifica-
tions, implementations, and even its parameters. In our white-box
experiments, the attacker has full access to the CTGAN generator of
CTGAN-LIME. In other words, the attacker generates training data
for c from the same sampler which the explainability model uses to
generate explanations. This is a strictly stronger adversarial setting
than the black-box counterpart and provides a stronger evaluation
of robustness.
4.3 Evaluation
We measure the robustness of an explainability algorithm based on
top-k accuracy, or the proportion of explanations which correctly
identify the sensitive feature (e.g. race, gender) to be among the top
k contributing features for the adversarial model a. In other words,
this represents how well the explainability model is able to detect
biased behavior.
5 EXPERIMENT DETAILS
In this section we elaborate our experimental details and settings.
We measure robustness across the following three datasets:
• COMPAS recidivism [4]: A dataset where the task is to
predict whether a given criminal defendant will commit
another offense. The sensitive feature used by the biased
classifier a is Race.
• German credit [1]: A dataset which classifies how good or
bad a given loan applicant is. The sensitive feature is Gender,
and the biased classifier predicts "good" if Gender = "male"
and "bad" if otherwise.
• Communities and crime [7]: A dataset which measures
various socio-economic and law-enforcement variables of
communities in the US. As done in [11], we convert the
dataset into a classification task whereby a community is
labelled "high-crime" if the violent crime rate is above the me-
dian and "low-crime" otherwise. We designate the white pop-
ulation proportion as the sensitive attribute. The biased clas-
sifier predicts "high-crime" if white population proportion <
0.5 and "low-crime" if otherwise.
Explanations are generated using the test set of each dataset. For
all experiments, we use a Random Forest classifier as the black-box
model with which we generate explanations. For each dataset, we
vary the number of top features k to be returned by the explainer.
Both COMPAS and German credit data contain 9 features each,
hence we choose k = {1, 3, 5}. The communities and crime dataset
contains 100 features, and hence the choice k = {1, 10, 30} is more
appropriate.
6 RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of each of our experiments.
Section 6.1 compares the robustness of LIME and CTGAN-LIME.
Section 6.2 compares the quality of explanations of each explainer,
and Section 6.3 presents a qualitative comparison of the synthetic
samples generated by the respective methods.
6.1 Robustness comparison
Tables 2 and 3 refer to the accuracies of the explainability model
on predictions generated by the black-box and white-box Fooling-
LIME attacks respectively. For each dataset, we measure accuracy
for different values of k , or the number of top features generated
by the explainer.
CTGAN-LIME achieves higher accuracy than LIME for each
dataset, indicating that it can better detect biased behavior of the
adversarial model across different datasets. In the white-box attack
setting, the attacker has access to the CTGANmodel and its parame-
ters, thereby enabling the attacker to execute a more effective attack.
Indeed, Table 3 displays a decrease in accuracy of the CTGAN-LIME
model. However, we also note that the accuracy CTGAN-LIME is
still higher than that of LIME, indicating increased robustness over-
all; in fact, the Fooling-LIME attack using the CTGAN sampler is
slightly more effective than the original attack. Finally, we observe
that the discriminator d(x) which filters low-quality samples helps
improve the accuracy of CTGAN-LIME further.
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Table 2: Top-k accuracy of explainers against the black-box Fooling-LIME attack with varying values of k
COMPAS German Credit Communities
Explainer / k 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 10 30
LIME 0.00 42.71 70.90 0.00 47.20 65.60 0.00 9.22 35.47
CTGAN-LIME 99.74 99.55 99.68 61.20 59.20 61.60 2.20 31.26 48.50
CTGAN-LIME with d(x) 99.94 100.00 100.00 60.80 65.60 67.60 7.01 83.97 95.99
Table 3: Top-k accuracy of explainers against white-box Fooling-LIME attack with varying values of k
COMPAS German Credit Communities
Explainer / k 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 10 30
LIME 0.00 38.43 69.09 0.00 44.80 64.80 0.00 8.82 36.07
CTGAN-LIME 82.70 88.14 88.74 16.80 52.40 56.80 0.60 10.82 25.45
CTGAN-LIME with d(x) 84.33 96.57 96.81 28.80 58.80 65.00 6.21 83.17 94.59
6.2 Explainer comparison
Beyond robustness, we also measure the quality of explanations of
CTGAN-LIME and compare them to those of LIME. To this end, we
rely on the precision metric proposed in [8]:
precision(E) = EQ (x ′ |E)
[
1f (x )=f (x ′)
]
(10)
where E is the explanation andQ(x ′ |E) is a set of samples x ′ ∈ X
which satisfy the predicates in E. What precision aims to measure is
the agreement between the model’s prediction f (x) and the model’s
prediction on other samples which are similar to x according to the
features identified as influential in E. Table 4 reports the precision
of CTGAN-LIME on each dataset and shows that CTGAN-LIME
can achieve comparable precision to LIME. This suggests that the
quality of explanations by CTGAN-LIME is on par with that of
LIME.
Table 4: Precision on each dataset
COMPAS German Credit Communities
LIME 71.49 74.58 82.87
CTGAN-LIME 73.27 77.89 80.64
6.3 Qualitative analysis
In Figure 2, the numerical data of the COMPAS dataset is projected
onto the first and second principal component. The robust samples
drawn from CTGAN (green) more realistically represent the true
data (red) than the data generated by the vanilla sampler (blue).
The vanilla samples are clustered in a small area, and the scale is
roughly equal in the direction of both principal axes. This agrees
with intuition, as the data is sampled from a unit Gaussian ball.
However, the true underlying data manifold is clearly long tailed
and not Gaussian. The CTGAN sampler is hence better able to
represent the underlying data distribution and improve robustness.
Figure 2: PCA of numerical features for COMPAS dataset
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have shown empirical results suggesting that utilizing a gen-
erative adversarial network like CTGAN to sample synthetic data
for generating explanations can improve robustness towards ad-
versarial attacks. We hope this work will inspire additional efforts
towards making explainability algorithms like LIME more robust
and reliable. In particular, future work would focus on further con-
ducting empirical evaluations as well as establishing theoretical
justifications and bounds for the robustness of explanations.
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